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Turkey-EU relations after the 2011 Cypriot EEZ gas discoveries 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This project investigates, through 4 key aspects how the events following 
the 2011 Cypriot natural gas discoveries potentially could, and has 
affected the relationship between Turkey and the EU. The project is a case 
study, written on a rational institutionalist foundation, assuming rational 
state behavior from Turkey concerning institutional involvement with the 
EU. Escalation of Turkish aggression towards Cyprus since we set out the 
project has dominantly influenced the outcome of the project conclusion. 
On one hand it has greatly lowered the prospects of utilizing the enormous 
potential of the case fully to benefit both the EU, Turkey and Cyprus. On 
the other hand it has also evoked us to rethink state rationalism in a 
complex international arena with many actors and variables. 
 
 
 
Problem formulation:  
 
How might recent gas discoveries in the Cypriot EEZ change the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU? 
1. Problem Area: 
 
Turkey possess a strategic geographical location at the crossroads of the major natural 
gas-rich regions the Caspian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean on the one hand, and 
the natural gas consuming and needing Europe on the other hand. On December 28, 
2011, estimated gross mean resources of 5 trillion cubic feet was discovered by 
natural gas exploration company Noble in the Cypriot “Block 12” located in the EU 
Member State’s Exclusive Economic Zone. A year earlier Noble also discovered an 
even larger natural gas discovery named “Leviathan” near the coast of Israel. While 
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production and extraction in these areas are expected in 2017, the political dilemmas 
lie in the exportation of resources (Noble Energy Corporate Overview fact Sheet 
2014, 2014, p. 2; PR-Newswire, Noble Energy Announces Significant Natural Gas 
Discovery Offshore Republic of Cyprus, 2011). The non-existing diplomatic relations 
between Cyprus and Turkey however imply that as long as this dispute is ongoing, 
any pipeline project transporting resources from Block 12 through Turkey is strongly 
challenged. This is problematic as the “TANAP Project” is planned to begin 
construction in 2015, constructing a pipeline from Azerbaijan (The Caspian Sea) 
through Turkey to Europe. Connecting to this pipeline would be far cheaper than 
constructing a new pipeline from Cyprus through Greece. The Leviathan gas 
discovery near Israel would furthermore for the most cost effective solution need to 
move through Cyprus, thereby connecting both Block 12 and Leviathan gas to 
TANAP, making Turkey a trading hub between Europe and Asia (H. Bürosu, 2014; M. 
Hoffman, 2014, p. 95-99). The Azerbaijani gas supplies through TANAP would, 
without the before mentioned additional sources only provide Europe with about 2% 
of its annual energy demands. With Cyprus as the key point of export for the newly 
discovered energy sources, Cyprus could however end up supplying 50% of the EU’s 
additional gas needs (C. Levoyannis & M.Labrèche, 2013).  
 
There are various diplomatic reasons for Turkey to reconsider its relationship with its 
neighbors. Apart from improving its bilateral relationship with Israel through the 
TANAP pipeline connection, the diplomatic relationship with Cyprus however is the 
key problem. A big obstacle in the Turkey-EU relationship is its refusal to recognize 
the sovereignty of state of Cyprus (B. Akcapar, 2007, p. 72). Turkey would though 
benefit largely from the Cypriot energy discoveries, but it would be on the condition 
of a normalization of its bilateral relationship with Cyprus, if the pipelines were to 
cross the divided state. A normalization could in turn lead to Cyprus removing its veto 
on various policy areas in Turkey’s membership negotiating process. The Greek 
Cypriot administration is  the only EU member blocking the energy chapter. (W. 
Chislett, 2014). The importance of energy becomes even more relevant in the light of 
EU post-crimean decisions  of reducing its Russian dependence on energy exports and 
instead accelerate further diversification of its energy supply. This is all with 
particular focus on the new discoveries in the Mediterranean (General Secretariat of 
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the European Council, 2014, p. 10; W. Chislett, 2014). This project aims to analyze 
how these conditions and circumstances along with recent events could affect the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU. 
2. Working questions:  
 
a) What is the current agenda in EU and Turkey’s energy policy, with particular 
regards to gas, and how could this affect our case? 
b) How does the Turkish-Cypriot political dispute affect our case?  
 
c) Which aspects of international law are particular relevant in our case? 
d) Which constraints and advantages to the case already exists in the political 
relationship between Turkey and the EU? 
3. Methods: 
 
From when we initially set out our research certain events, particularly turkish power 
displays and threats towards Cyprus’ maritime exploration in its EEZ, has proven the 
aspect of international law very relevant to the case (K. Ayat, 2014). We will 
approach the problem area with an rational institutionalist epistemological approach 
to international law which will be elaborated on below:  
     The problem formulation purposefully outlines two main actors – The institution 
of EU on one hand and the state of Turkey on the other.  
We will analyze their interaction through a rational institutional design. This 
concerns importantly how we analyze and interpret the actions of states and 
institutions. The following thus explain our theoretical approach to our case study: 
Rational institutionalism explicitly builds on some realist state assumptions. They can 
broadly be defined as 1) states are primary actors in world politics; 2) they can be 
analyzed as if they were rational; and 3) they are not altruistic, but rather “self-
interested” (M. Brecher & F. Harvey, 2002, p. 154). Rational istitutionalism is 
utilizing these assumptions with the acknowledgment of the importance of institutions 
and argue that the state is hence the main actor in institutional settings – in our case 
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the EU. It is the self-interested motivations that drive state participation in institutions, 
but while engagement in the institutional setting will provide basis for long-term 
cooperation which in turn gives the institution the high degree of power, which 
rational institutionalists recognizes. It is thus also expected that international 
organizations shall engage heavily in monitoring state behavior (M. Brecher & F. 
Harvey, 2002, p. 155). This provide theoretical analytical basis for us in the case 
study to examine it as a setting of communication and actions not just from one state 
actor,Turkey, but from interactions between Turkey and the EU.  
 
In order for us to assess what effects our case has on the Turkey-EU relations we must 
understand the basis of why Turkey would act in the way it does. Rational 
institutionalism will as a theoretical approach account for this while recognizing the 
importance of institutions. We are of the belief that institutional legal rules and 
procedures can shape the international political structure by creating incentives for 
self-interested sovereign states to engage in “sustained cooperation with one another”. 
We thereby believe that the institution of the EU in our case merely is an arena for 
Turkey to pursue their own self-interest in ways that facilitate long-term cooperation 
over time and compliance with formalized rules and norms (B. Cali, 2010, p. 35-36). 
We are thereby explicitly of the belief that Turkish gas-cooperation with EU would 
benefit all actors involved, but would be engaged primarily in self-interest.  
 
3.1. Approach: 
 
The project is written on the basis of a qualitative inductive case study research. 
Structurally we have divided the case study into four working questions, where each 
question will contribute to the analysis of our problem. These working questions 
should illustrate four key aspects of the case, specifically: 1) Each party’s current 
energy security agenda, 2) international law, 3) the Cypriot issue and finally 4) pre-
existing constraints and advantages in the Turkey-EU relationship relevant to our 
case. These are all aspects we, from our rational institutional approach, has considered 
the most important aspects of the case, and they will be approached accordingly in the 
corresponding sections. These four aspects are in some points overlapping in context, 
but does in isolation allow us to dissect a complex case into counterparts, which each 
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highlight the most important factors or variables that will shape our conclusion. The 
aspects will for that reason be examined first separately and finally brought together 
to conclude on how they together affect the relationship between Turkey and the EU. 
 
4. How might recent gas discoveries in the Cypriot EEZ change the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU? 
 
4.1. What is the current agenda in EU and Turkey’s energy policy, with particular 
regards to gas, and how could this affect our case? 
 
To understand how recent gas discoveries in the Cypriot EEZ could raise new 
perspectives on the Turkey-EU relationship, it is first necessary to grasp the changed 
international energy security conditions which has laid the foundation for these new 
perspectives. In our case study we explicitly assume that if the relationship between 
Turkey and EU were to be enhanced it would, on realist assumptions, require an 
agreement that would benefit both parties. If any mutually beneficial agreements 
between the two parties are met, regarding the Cypriot gas, we, from our rational 
institutional approach, find it appropriate to conclude that the relationship has 
positively intensified with deeper cooperation. Intensified institutional involvement 
from Turkey in the EU would thus be grounded in rational decision-making processes 
from both parties on the premise that 1) the EU would benefit, be it economically or 
politically, from diversifying its gas imports by importing Cypriot gas through 
Turkey, and 2) Turkey would benefit, be it economically or politically from gas 
cooperation with the EU, by allowing Cypriot gas to run through its territory. In other 
words, we will need to first examine the agenda of energy needs from both parties in 
order to assess wether or not the Cypriot gas case could remarkably change the 
Turkey-EU relationship. Both 1) and 2) will have to be true for us to conclude our 
case as significant for deepening of the Turkey-EU relationship. Here it should be 
noted that our research is utilizing qualitative sources and potential benefits of either 
party is not quantitatively researched. The assessment of these criteria will be 
grounded in official governmental and institutional declarations and conclusions, 
together with arguments from outside spectators.  
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The overall need for energy diversification for the EU is to little debate and is widely 
agreed upon amongst the spectrum of EU institutions and outside spectators. Up to 
32% of EU’s total natural gas imports was in 2012 accounted for by Russia and in 
2013 that number had rose to 39% (Eurostat, 2012, 2013). In the policy field of 
energy security, this is in itself already considered a high share, but made even more 
imminent in the light of the Russian annexation of Crimea in the former half of 2014. 
On 21st of March 2014 The European Council stressed the need to accelerate further 
diversification of its energy supply, in particular gas, on behalf of the political 
disruptions with Russia. This argument was also high on the agenda in the European 
Energy Security Strategy where it was made very clear that accessing more 
diversified natural gas resources is indeed a high priority (European Council - Council 
Meeting 210314, 2014 p. 10; European Council, 2014 p. 12; K. Ayat, 2014). Michael 
Hoffmann, External Affairs Director of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) furthermore 
highlights the need for Europe to have multiple and secure supply routes bringing gas 
to the market (M. Hoffman, 2014, p. 95).  
 
       Not as clear-cut as the need for diversification itself is the source of imports and 
Turkeys’ role in the considerations, as there exists many plausible import options 
including Northern America, Australia, Qatar and new discoveries in East-Africa 
(European Council, 2014, p. 15) Turkey does however to its benefit find itself in a 
potentially lucrative geo-political location, considering its routing of the planned 
TANAP and TAP (H. Bürosu, 2014; Figure 1 – see appendix). This is one of the 
reasons why the Southern Corridor through Turkey is a logical choice for 
Mediterranean gas discoveries. In the before mentioned European Council meeting it 
was additionally concluded that further action should be taken to support the 
development of the Southern Corridor, including further spur routes through Eastern 
Europe. Interconnection to this infrastructure should include the Mediterranean area, 
including the Cypriot EEZ (European Council, Council Meeting 210314, 2014, p. 10). 
The 2014 European Energy Security Strategy further stresses that this potential 
pipeline connection could be vital in providing a connection to the Middle East, 
through Turkey, accommodating up to 25 billion m3 of gas for the European market 
(European Council, 2014 p. 16). Assistant Director at Atlantic Council, R. Gramer, 
additionally argues that the political opportunities that the Cypriot natural-gas 
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deposits provide could help finally resolve the Cypriot dispute while curtailing 
Russia’s energy leverage over Europe (R. Gramer, 2014, p. 1). Development and 
further expansion of gas supply infrastructure with the Southern Gas Corridor as well 
as the Mediterranean gas hub is thus, under the right conditions, very welcomed by 
the EU institutions (European Council, 2014 p. 17). The EU would benefit, 
particularly in the field of energy-security, from diversifying its gas imports by 
importing Cypriot gas through Turkey – thereby concluding premise 1) as existing. 
This conclusion does however not exclude the option of EU investment in alternative 
routes bypassing Turkey, but merely concludes that Turkey could contribute to the 
much need European energy diversification.    
Turkey’s demand for natural gas has risen tremendously from over the past 30 years 
from 0,7 billion m3 in 1987 to 45,3 billion cubic meters in 2012 with only 0,63 billion 
m3 being domestically extracted. (U.S. Energy Information Administrations, 2014, p. 
1-9; International Energy Agency, 2014, p. 14-18). This growing energy demand 
entail that Turkey has great interest in any nearby energy discoveries, to supply its 
domestic demands while simultaneously utilizing its strategic location for export (W. 
Chislett 2014, p.1). Concerning Turkish benefits of gas flows through its territory 
from Cyprus M. Hoffman does on this issue state a very important argument. He 
argues that Turkey has enormous geographic and strategic potential. If all the gas 
from The Eastern Mediterranean, and also from the Caspian Sea, needs to flow to 
Europe “it has to pass through Turkey” which in turn creates a great opportunity for 
Turkey to benefit from being an important energy hub (M. Hoffman, 2014, p. 100). 
Turkey does in its 2014 European Union Strategy further reinforce the importance of 
its energy-relations with the EU and aims to continue this. Due to its important global 
position, Turkey wishes to see the European Project overcoming the challenges of the 
twenty-first century and extending its influence across all geographies in the 
upcoming period (Republic of Turkey – Ministry for EU affairs, 2014, p. 5). 
Geographically the Cyprus-Turkey dispute does however create an obstacle in 
connecting Cypriot Gas to TANAP. We will though argue that Turkey would benefit, 
both economically and politically from by allowing Cypriot gas to run through its 
territory. Economically it would according to a wide range of experts and diplomats 
by far be the most economical solution for East Mediterranean gas to arrive to 
markets through the construction a Cyprus-Turkey pipeline infrastructure (Crisis 
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Group Europe Report N°216, 2012, p. 15). Politically, very high on the EU agenda is 
the benefits which would accrue from a normalization of the Turkey-Cyprus 
diplomatic relations. By cooperating on the gas distribution, these benefits include not 
only the economical benefits as mentioned before but also the political benefits in 
form of the opening of many accession chapters currently blocked by the Cypriot 
dispute (European Commission, 2014, p. 4-19) This will be thoroughly discussed in 
the next section. We can though conclude both 1) and 2) to be true – both parties 
would, all things being equal, from a rational institutional perspective, benefit from 
this hypothetical energy cooperation. All things are however not equal, and Turkish 
energy policy is at the moment of writing not as focused on EU energy cooperation as 
it is on defending its territorial maritime rights in the form of military threats towards 
Cyprus. Thus this section has concluded that different focuses exists in the energy 
policy focus between the two parties, but any potential agreement letting Cyprus 
transfer its gas through Turkey could benefit both parties in economical and political 
ways.  
	  
4.2. How does the Turkish-Cypriot political dispute affect our case? 
 
In 1974 Turkey occupied the northern third of Cyprus, and declared the northern half 
of Cyprus as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, this state however is only 
recognized by Turkey (B. Akçapar, 2007, p. 180). The other two thirds of Cyprus is 
fully governed by the Republic of Cyprus, this state is recognized by the rest of the 
world as the rightful government of Cyprus (E. LaGro & K. Jørgensen, p. 51-57). This 
is causing a problem due to the questions of whose Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
the gas exploitations of Block 12 is belonging to. As the government of Turkey does 
not recognize Cyprus as an independent state, they do not recognize Cyprus' EEZ 
either. These geopolitical problems are resulting in Turkish harassments of the 
Cypriot drilling stations. It is also preventing the Cypriot government from even 
considering a cooperation with Turkey on the gas pipelines (Today's Zaman, 2011). 
 
However, we will not discussing the matter of the Turkey-Cyprus issue, but the matter 
is being addressed in order for it to to be utilized in this analysis, to cover the aspects 
of the case which are contributing, either positive or negative, to the relationship 
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between the EU and Turkey. Therefore it is of great importance to clarify and analyze 
the political tensions between Turkey and Cyprus, and how this might affect the 
relationship with the European Union. 
 
The relationship between the EU and Turkey is being compromised by the Turkish-
Cypriot conflict. As Cyprus is a member state following the principles of the Union, 
Turkey is less a priority for the Union,  and even though Turkey is seen as a candidate 
state, the relationship of the EU and Turkey is depending on the development of the 
relationship between Cyprus and Turkey (European Commission, 2014, p. 46). On 
this matter the EU is encouraging and contributing to a positive climate between the 
two states of Turkey and Cyprus, a climate which will benefit both states. This 
however will be conducted through the terms of the founding principles of the Union, 
this is at first glance not a Turkish advantage, but it is the terms of the settlement. 
Furthermore the EU states that non-conducive acts towards a positive atmosphere in 
this conflict will be avoided, anyhow Turkey still maintain their believe on their right 
to harass the Cypriot drilling stations within the Cypriot EEZ (European Commission, 
2014, p. 47). 
 
In this case, Greek-Cypriot Government spokesman Stefanos Stefanou, argues that the 
EU lacks clout, in terms of the EU not being sufficient enough when talking sanctions 
and avoiding conflict. The Greek-Cypriots demand a Turkish statement that they will 
not harass the Cypriot efforts on the field of gas exploitation, while on the other hand, 
Turkey, who neither recognizes Cyprus nor their EEZ, argues that the Cypriots shall 
refrain from the gas exploitation, and thus not increase the areas of conflict (Today's 
Zaman, 2011). 
The European Parliament believes that, if properly managed, the exploitations of the 
gas in the region, could improve both the Turkish-Cypriot and the Greek-Cypriots 
economic, political and social relations (European Parliament, 2014). This statement 
from the EU is irrefutable, at least on the economical aspect. However, the terms of 
the final agreements over Block 12 will determine the degree of improvement in the 
aspects of political and social relations. This will arguably be determined through the 
management of the negotiations and the exploitations – and finally the political 
decisions on the matter of distribution of the gas. 
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However, the Turkish government does not act according to these directions from the 
European Union, as they are keen on continuously conducting seismic surveys in the 
Cypriot EEZ. As a response to these actions, the European Parliament now urges 
Turkey  “to show restraint and act in accordance with international law” (European 
Parliament, 2014).  
 
This Turkey-Cyprus conflict, is therefore also a serious obstacle for the constructions 
of the gas pipelines from Block 12 through Turkey to Europe, and so it is also a 
problem for the EU, as the costs of building a new pipeline, not involving Turkey, 
would be towering, opposed to, if becoming possible, connecting the Cypriot 
pipelines to the TANAP pipeline which is being constructed through Turkey and 
leading in to the European Union (H. A. Samaras, 2011). 
This section concludes that historical political disputes between Turkey and Cyprus 
are creating physical and political barriers for contemporary energy cooperation over 
the Cypriot gas deposits. Geopolitically, we can thus argue that a potential mutually 
optimal pipeline route through Turkey is obstructed through a dispute over sovereign 
borders. 
 
4.3. Which aspects of international law are particular relevant in our case? 
As it should be clear from the previous section, the most recent revivals of the old 
Cypriot dispute in the form of Turkish threats has not only highlighted the case’s 
geopolitical problems but also higher and more universal breaches of international 
law and principles strongly connected to Turkey-EU relations. These will be assessed 
in this section where particular focus needs to be directed towards the aspect of 
international law, in the context of Turkey-EU relations and the recent unilateral 
actions displayed towards Cypriot maritime exploration. International law and the 
compliance with it, is essential for Turkish institutional cooperation with the EU who 
in The Treaty of the European Union makes it clear that it “consolidate and support 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law” 
(TEU, 2012, art. 21(b)). Breaches of institutional norms and rules will diminish 
chances of any institutional involvement of Turkey in the EU, as institutional 
involvement in our theoretical framework requires compliance with institutionally 
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established rules. 
 
We will argue that from an EU legal perspective the actions of Turkey in Cyprus EEZ 
violates at least three important legal policy areas on which the EU is founded on, or 
functioning by, which include: a) Neighborhood policy, b) acquis communautaire – 
including United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) c) general 
International law. 
  
Overall it must be stated that while the European Neighborhood Policy is primarily 
concerning bilateral relationships between Member States and third countries, and the 
acquis communautaire are internal principles on which the EU is founded – to which 
Turkey is obviously not directly bound by – compliance with these are obligatory in 
order for accession talks to progress (European Commission, 2014, p. 28).  
      First, failure to comply with essential elements in the neighborhood policy is 
expressed by the European Parliament in its “Resolution on Turkish actions creating 
tensions in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus”. The parliament reinstates its 
numerous previous accommodations to get Turkey to commit itself unequivocally to 
good neighborly relations and peaceful settlement of disputes (European Parliament, 
2014). It reinstates the importance of Turkish policy to align with EU approaches to 
neighborly disputes in diplomatic manners. The parliament does in this connection 
remind Turkey that its accession “remains dependent upon the fulfillment of all its 
contractual commitments vis-à-vis the European Union and all its Member States”. 
These provisions underline the normative approach incorporated in the handling of 
the Cyprus-Turkey dispute, and urges Turkey to harmonize its foreign policy to 
compatibility with EU foreign policy, despite Turkey not itself belonging in the 
European Neighborhood Policy. (European Parliament, 2014, p. 1) 
       
Second, it is decided that all prospective members must enact legislation to bring their 
laws into line with the laws of the EU (European Parliament, 2014, p. 1). Any 
candidate country must adopt, implement and enforce all of the acquis, which is 
indisputable (European Commission, 2014).  
The EU has recently ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which is as furthermore now an additional but integral part of its acquis 
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communautaire. The European parliament clarified on the 11th of November 2014 that 
Turkey’s actions against Cypriot maritime gas exploration constituted a clear 
violation of the UNCLOS and thereby the acquis communautaire (European 
Parliament, 2014, p. 1). The European Commission furthermore underlines all the 
sovereign rights of EU Member States covered under the acquis. It stresses hereunder 
in its Enlargement Strategy, especially the right to “enter into bilateral agreements and 
to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with (…) UNCLOS” 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 28). 
       
Third we will argue that Turkey in its attempt to disrupt Cypriot gas exploration is 
violating international law in general as well. International law covers of course the 
previous two points in the institutional framework of the EU. We will though 
furthermore argue that the sovereignty of Cyprus is breached even further by the 
recent threats, as they are undertaken under the Turkish assumption that the EEZ of 
Cyprus is of their belonging. This statement is however only defended by one state 
worldwide – Turkey itself. This creates serious problems to the legitimacy of the 
Turkish ambitions to align itself with EU principles (European Commission, 2014, p. 
6). 
 
4.4. Which constraints and advantages to the case already exist in the political 
relationship between Turkey and the EU? 
 
This fourth aspect presents relevant important milestones and conditions in the span 
of Turkey-EU relations and how pre-existing constraints and advantages in the 
relationship could be reevaluated in the light of our case. The relationship has always 
been deeply embedded in economy, security and energy, and the EU has always 
underlined the strategic importance of Turkey and incentive to enhance this attribute, 
but also withhold various policy areas which has a negative effect on their 
relationship. (European Commission, 2014, p. 1-4). The historical foundation upon 
which the relationship is founded is thus important as a point of reference to evaluate 
any negative or positive discourse our case of study has contributed to it.  
When analyzing the previous relationship between the European Union and Turkey, 
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the Ankara Agreement is a cornerstone in the political aspects of the relationship. It 
was originally initiated in 1963 where it was envisaged three stages for the integration 
of Turkey and the European Union, namely a preparatory stage, a transitional stage 
and a final stage (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). 
However this agreement has come to a pause in the development of the stages. Thus 
the negotiations and development of the Ankara Agreement has been paused, as it 
cannot continue on eight of the chapters, as long as Turkey does not recognize the 
Republic of Cyprus as an independent and existing state. The recent gas discoveries, 
we will argue, has thus if anything, worsened the progress in this policy area, as 
Turkey, as described in the last two sections, continues to act both judicially and 
politically against any form of reconciliation (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2014). 
 
The security dimension of the Turkey-EU relations is however an advantage to 
Turkey we will argue that has only been made even more apparent under the events of 
our case. Turkey simultaneously borders Europe, the Middle East including the 
Mediterranean, the Balkan, the Black Sea and energy-wise very importantly also 
connects to the Caspian regions, Iraq and the former Soviet Union via pipelines.  
Turkey is religiously Islamic but officially secular, and broadly European in outlook 
and aspirations and it neighbors troubled regions and countries such as the Caucasus, 
Iran, Syria and iraq. This means that Turkey’s diplomacy has increasingly reflected 
the complexity and diversity of its geopolitical circumstances and security-wise 
important surroundings (M. Lake 2005, p. 127-31). Although the EU has not always 
sympathized with Turkey in its regional relations, it has long been clear that Turkey  
could provide important security in both energy connection and regional security 
(Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). In the Turkish Progress 
Report from 2014, the European Commission underlined that recent development in 
its joint neighborhood, particularly in Ukraine, strengthened the importance of 
Turkey’s strategic location. Thus the EU goal of regional stability in its neighboring 
countries does in our case overlap strongly with the imminent need for energy 
diversification to which Turkey could be a very important actor (European 
Commission, 2014, p. 1-20). The recent gas discoveries in Cyprus underlines the 
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strategic importance of Turkey in Europe’s post-Crimea energy conundrum, and is 
clearly, if not an enhancement, then a reinstatement of the importance of geopolitics. 
(W. Chislett, 2014, p. 1; M. Hoffman, 2014, p. 94-100; J. Daly, 2013, p. 1). We will 
however argue that Turkish displays of power in Cypriot EEZ has greatly lowered the 
prospects of full utilization of Turkish geography and weakened its potential links to 
the Middle East through Cyprus.  
 
5. Which key constraints and opportunities in relation to our case could either 
diminish or enhance the relationship between Turkey and the EU? 
We have through the previous sections and literature review established a notion that 
the gas discoveries in the Cypriot EEZ have contributed to a new perspective on the 
Turkey-EU relations. The analytical structure of our approach to the problem has been 
purposefully constructed to mirror the discourse of the literature covering our problem 
area and how this has parallel to our project changed from idealistic expectations to 
realistic disappointment. Working question a) assessed the foundation, or potential of 
the Cypriot gas discoveries and made clear that, on one hand the EU would at least 
politically and energy security-wise benefit from diversifying its gas imports by a 
Cypriot/Turkish TANAP connection. One the other hand, Turkey would benefit both 
economically and politically by allowing Cypriot gas to run through its territory to the 
EU. This is based on, and reflects, of course literature either covering the situation 
before Turkish interruption or merely, as it is the case with our section, the very 
potential inherited in the gas discovery. On that note we still hold the opinion that 
Cypriot gas linkage to TANAP could create opportunities for all parties involved 
through a long-term cooperation. It is in long terms though, as Turkish institutional 
involvement and cooperation over the gas would not immediately meet all the needs 
for energy diversification that EU has, but it could pave way for stronger energy 
cooperation between politically diverse parties in the future. This optimism was 
represented strongly in the first phase of the case (R. Gramer, 2014; W. Chislett, 
2014; D. Koranyi and N. Sartori, 2014; M. Hoffman, 2014; C. Levoyannis and M. 
Labrèche, 2014; H. A. Samaras, 2011).  
 
	   17	  
After the Turkish disruption of the Cypriot maritime exploration we would though 
argue that a distrusting or realist discourse created what we term as the second phase 
of the case. Promising opportunities and potential were reevaluated in the light of a re-
ignition of the long Turkey-Cyprus dispute (K. Ayat, 2014; M. Hadjicostis, 2014; L. 
Norman, 2014). The European institutions, as previously described, similarly 
expressed the opportunities of the case and stated that energy cooperation could be 
part of a negotiation towards accession for Turkey. It is thus important to note that 
before the Turkish threats, the Cypriot dispute did not ultimately downgrade any 
expectations of gas cooperation. We defend this from our theoretical approach, which 
can be explained through rational expectations of the state behavior.  
From our examination and conclusion on the mutual gains of long-term cooperation, 
many incentives pointed towards cooperative actions from Turkey. Not in an altruistic 
manner however, but by an evaluation of absolute rather than relative gains. In this 
line of argumentations we would expect actions from Turkey where gains would 
encompass economic as well as cultural gains through peaceful relations rather than a 
defense of sovereign territory and power. This is with particular regards partly to the 
need of energy import that Turkey itself has and partly to the clear declarations of the 
Turkish will to align itself with the Acquis for future accession negotiation. We can in 
an evaluation of a rational institutionalist perspective present two appropriate 
examinations of the uncooperative manner in which Turkey has dealt with the Cypriot 
gas discoveries.  
 
Either we must reevaluate the usage of rational institutionalist approaches to a case of 
this sort where it might be argued that institutions play a less important role in 
transnational relations and where states and other non-state actors are, in a higher 
degree than theoretically expected, the main actors. A state such as Turkey would only 
engage in gas cooperation with the EU if it was an arena for Turkey to most rationally 
pursue their own self-interest. Even though EU membership and trade is an interest 
for Turkey, the grand network of gas pipes, investment speculation and alternative 
cooperative partners in the east and south neighborhood of Turkey creates a need to 
examine other important actors in our case. However, as Turkey is the only actor 
currently obstructing or slowing down any institutional cooperation over the Cypriot 
gas, we find it very appropriate to withhold the status of Turkey as the primary actor.  
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Another explanation lies close to the rational institutionalists expectation of rational 
state behavior from Turkey. While the prospects of stronger engagement with the EU 
are a priority, it is a priority maybe not as imminent as Turkey’s internal demand for 
gas and the opportunities for gas exports, which lies in the Cypriot discoveries. 
Despite the various Turkish international law violations we examined earlier, the 
unclosed conflict with Cyprus is at the same time as being an obstacle for 
improvement of EU relations, also the only argument Turkey has for claiming 
ownership of the gas. This does in our framework indicate that claims of gas 
ownership is the most rational decision in contrast to EU cooperation. We have 
however underlined the benefits Turkey could potentially harvest from EU 
cooperation and it does in this connection seem appropriate to label Turkish actions as 
irrational behavior. As we have however also underlined, the Cypriot dispute has been 
on-going and with few indications of resolution, despite clear arguments from the EU 
that this would drastically improve accession talks. It is thereby fair to argue that the 
Cypriot dispute is deeply rooted in Turkish policy and is as demonstrated in our case 
prioritized very high. Resulting from this assumption is thus an expectation for 
Turkey to defend their stance in the dispute, as the recent threats are not only rational 
in connection to defending sovereignty, but also not very different from the history of 
the Turkey-Cyprus dispute. Consequently, we must acknowledge that what seems as 
rational state behavior from an EU institutional approach, might not correspond to the 
approach of Turkey, who has a different set of ideas of international law and 
principles of diplomacy. These ideas we will argue is though acting as a big constraint 
in a case that possesses enormous potential for all parties involved. 
 
Our case has progressed in a manner that has forced us to reevaluate what rational 
state behavior is. In the first phase of the case, the international circumstances 
indicated for us an environment in which Turkey were expected to engage 
cooperatively with the EU and its Member States as it proved mutually benefitting for 
all parties. This was however under the assumption that improvement of Turkish EU 
relations was prioritized higher for Turkey than it through the line of events evidently 
was. The Cypriot dispute and the ideas embedded in it has though proven to be at a 
level of priority overshadowing the long-term benefits of institutional engagement 
with the EU.   
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6. Conclusion: 
 
How might recent gas discoveries in the Cypriot EEZ change the relationship 
between Turkey and the EU? 
Our case study set out to investigate how recent gas discoveries in the Cypriot EEZ 
could potentially change the relationship between Turkey and the EU. Our case study 
started by concluding that the gas discoveries did indeed have potential to create 
mutually benefitting agreements between Turkey and the EU both in economic and 
political forms. From our rational institutionalist approach this means an incentive for 
both parties to engage in intensified deeper institutional cooperation or in other words; 
an expectation of the rational state behavior in our case to be of a cooperative nature. 
This was based on the confirmed premises for cooperation that 1) the EU would 
benefit, especially politically, from diversifying its gas imports by importing Cypriot 
gas through Turkey, and 2) Turkey would benefit, both economically and politically 
from gas cooperation with the EU, by allowing Cypriot gas to run through its 
territory. The examination of the energy agenda for both parties did apart from 
confirming the opportunities of the discoveries also set out rational state behavior 
expectations for Turkey, which was during our research immediately disproved 
through further aggressive development in Turkish attempts to claim ownership over 
the Cypriot Gas deposits. These particular actions from Turkey, we will argue, 
regressed any positive development in the Turkey-EU relations in two important 
aspects – 1) Continuation and augmentation of an already existing obstacle for further 
EU cooperation in the form of the Cypriot dispute and 2) Recent violations of 
principles vital for the EU to continue accession negotiation. 
     First, historical political disputes between Turkey and Cyprus proved to create 
both physical and political barriers for energy cooperation. Turkey has an advantage 
in its geography, which at the same time also creates an obstacle through the historical 
diplomatic disputes with Cyprus. 
     Secondly the gas discoveries has, if anything proved reunification doubtful in the 
near future as Turkey continues to act both judicially and politically against any form 
of reconciliation, which is crucial for the case to affect the Turkey-EU relationship 
positively. Inherent in this is the violation of international law displayed through the 
threats that eliminates Turkish progress in Acquis alignment. 
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We continue to stress the potential and opportunities embedded in the gas discoveries, 
which could benefit all parties through long-term cooperation. The recent gas 
discoveries in Cyprus reinforces and reinvent the strategic importance of Turkey in 
Europe’s post-Crimea energy conundrum, and is clearly, if not an enhancement, then 
a reinstatement of the importance of geopolitics. Turkish displays of power in the 
Cypriot EEZ has though not only greatly lowered the prospects of full utilization of 
Turkish geography and weakened its potential links to the Middle East through 
Cyprus, but also disproved what the case established as rational state behavior for 
Turkey. Concluding, our case has proven the Cypriot gas discoveries to have a 
negative effect on the EU-Turkey relationship, but at the same time highlighted the 
positive long-term opportunities of transnational cooperative energy diversification. 
7. Limitations: 
 
This report is written with a certain page and time limit, which obviously limits the 
topic areas, in order for them to be sufficiently thorough.  Furthermore, it was from 
the beginning of the working schedule a desire to conduct one or more interviews 
with experts on the field, these interviews would have been useful in terms of putting 
some perspective into our analysis, and to support our conclusions. We however did 
manage to make contact to some prospects, but they did not possess the required time 
in order for them to answer properly on our questions. Though we managed to answer 
our problem formulation without conducting interviews, this would have been a 
finishing touch on the report. Thus there were some limitations when writing the 
project, but they were not of greater significance. 
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